Lithuanians on the Moon
Lithuanians on the Moon
and
Speaking the Language
01 July 2009
Chaghcharan, Ghor Province, Afghanistan
Lithuanian Lieutenant Marius Varna walked me around the perimeter of the small camp and we scanned the massive desolation of Afghanistan. The expanses, the dust, and the overwhelming sensation of brown and near-absence of refreshing green, under blue skies and squinting-bright sun. Only a handful of scrubby trees to be seen. One mountain wore a tint of green, as if it had been spray-painted from too far. Varna said it had sprouted after a rain a few weeks ago.
Nearby homes, mostly those of Tajiks, are formed from mud. The dwellings are unvented, and so the cooking fires inside lead to many illnesses. The dwellings could be a month old, or a thousand years. They look as ageless as dust or water. Varna pointed to a new settlement just near the camp and explained that the settlement had cropped up because of this camp and aid money flowing in, saying that kids who previously could not go to school are now in class. Including girls. Locals would later verify his claims.
The history of this land is mysterious and rich. Rudyard Kipling apparently based his book The Man Who Would Be King on the Pennsylvania-born American, Josiah Harlan, who’d come here to conquer and rule.
A BBC article explains:
“Harlan was a Pennsylvania-born adventurer who travelled to Afghanistan in the early 19th century, having sworn never to return to the US after an incident in Calcutta left him stranded.
He headed to Afghanistan with the intention of being made a king. He soon met up with Afghanistan's exiled king, to whom he was contracted to stir up rebellion in Kabul.”
Harlan must have been one crazy American to venture here some 170 years ago, though he was honored with the title “Prince of Ghor,” a title that his descendents now inherit. Kipling’s book was made into a film starring Sean Connery.
At over 2,280 meters above sea level (nearly 7,480 feet), the capital city of Chaghcharan has no factories, few cars or motorbikes, and air that is fresh and dry (and thin). Yet these are the lowlands. For about six months out of the year, the mountains around us could just as well be blanketed under a hundred miles of snow. When the snows arrive in about November, the place is socked in. The nearest paved road is about 380km (236 miles) away at Herat. Tens of thousands of people in the surrounding mountains and in this lowland are cut off from the world. There is nowhere to go but here. None of the Afghans have internet access, but there are cell phones. Even the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), run by the Lithuanians, becomes isolated other than by virtue of the gravel airstrip. They sometimes go several weeks without a flight. The place might as well be a spaceship, isolated first by the snows, then by the floods from the melting. This is a common story in Afghanistan.
There is not a single Afghan soldier in Ghor Province, and not one inch of paved road. As mentioned, the nearest paved road is about 380km toward Herat, or about the same to Kabul. Both are rough trips even during good weather. There are tribal frictions, banditry, and treacherous passes. One officer told me that it would cost about a million dollars per kilometer to build a paved road from Kabul through Chaghcharan and on to Herat. The cost would be nearly $800m U.S.
Chaghcharan is so far out that it might hardly seem worthy of our efforts to be here while we are critically short on troops.
And so why did Lt. Varna send me this message?
“Since 2005, this has been the most important mission for the Lithuanian Armed Forces, as Lithuania has been entrusted with an independent command of the province as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).”
That’s an interesting question; countless easily accessible places are in equal need of humanitarian assistance. More on that later.
The base itself is an international potpourri with soldiers and civilians from Croatia, Denmark, Georgia, Japan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Romania, the USA, and probably a few more countries. And today there are Italian pilots whose helicopter is having difficulty. From above, this base is just a sesame seed on the body of Afghanistan, but down here it’s a little Starship Enterprise. When I met the Lithuanian base commander, Colonel Alvydas Siuparis, I wanted to call him Captain Kirk, but he’s pretty big so I didn’t push my luck.
Amazingly, despite all the languages spoken on base and off, the people seem to communicate well enough. English is the lingua franca but anything will do. Lt. Varna was speaking Russian on the cell phone, and so I asked why he wasn’t using English or Lithuanian. Lt. Varna was talking with an Afghan, many of whom speak Russian. Often, when two people meet, the first question will be something like, “Which language?” They rattle off which languages they speak in hopes of a match-up. The base for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) should more accurately be called “Starship Babylon.” And the term PRT, though accurate in Iraq, should be changed to “PCT” (Provincial COnstruction Team) in Afghanistan. The Provincial REconstruction Teams in Iraq are far different. The term “reconstruction” in Iraq is generally correct, but it’s usually a misnomer in Afghanistan and confuses people at home by implying there was something here to reconstruct.
One certainty: the approximately two hundred people here at the PRT, led by the Lithuanians, are serious about making their imprint and pulling this place another meter forward. Ghor is austere and the PRT is tiny, so nobody is jumping for joy to be here, but it’s clear by the way they keep their gear and go about their business that they are serious about completing the mission, despite that it’s truly not fun.
Monday, some Lithuanians wanted to visit a local television station. And so we set off down the dusty road out of the PRT, by a tiny refuge settlement on the right. The Lithuanian mission was being led by Major Tomaj Madzar, a Croatian soldier, which was good for me because it meant the mission would be in English since he doesn’t speak Lithuanian. Major Madzar said the refugee camp sprouted up after some tribal fighting. It was a sorry shambles of raggedy tents flopping in the warm breeze.
On our left was the Hari River where people were washing a few vans, and maybe a hundred sheep were drinking while the shepherd waited about. The Hari River also passes by the giant “Jam Miniret” in Ghor, which is 65 meters tall. Nobody knows exactly who built it or why, but some think it might be about 800 years old, and there is said to be a Jewish cemetery nearby. Lithuanian archaeologists working in Ghor more recently discovered human artifacts that might be thousands of years old, and also ancient Buddhist sites of unknown age.
After taking a left and crossing a small bridge made of bricks and stone (which I was told had been paid for by USAID), we drove down the main street of Chaghcharan.
It would not have been surprising to see Fred and Wilma Flintstone roll by. I watched for men wearing tennis shoes. The Taliban and associated enemies often wear tennis shoes that fit. Pretty much everyone else either goes barefoot, wears sandals, or wears shoes that don’t fit. Luckily, here, the Tajiks tend to hate the Taliban, but some do join the fighting elsewhere, and it was possible that some might be home on leave.
We arrived at the television station and were greeted by the “chief,” Mohammad Jan Kendewalli, a Chaghcharan native and Dari speaker. So the meeting would be between an Afghan, a Lithuanian, a Croatian, and me, but luckily we had the Afghan interpreter named Feisal. The soldiers presented a needed computer to Kendewalli’s staff while we began the long meeting.
I do not vouch for the veracity of Kendewalli’s words, other than to say that he warned me, very politely, to be accurate. If his words were accurate, thus is the following account:
Kendewalli said that the Indian government had formed an agreement with the Afghan government to set up a national television broadcasting system throughout the provinces. This station, to serve Ghor Province, was set up one year later in 2007. June 30 will mark its second anniversary. The Indian government donated an antenna, 30kw generator, 100kw transmitter and other associated gear such as cameras. [This television business must cause concern for Pakistan.] The 32 batteries powering the UPS have stopped working and he cannot afford the $600 needed for replacements, but the system still mostly works. Kendewalli seemed perturbed that Indian government did not build the studio he said they promised.
Kendewalli said the transmitter will reach a 30km radius, 25-30 thousand people, and that most families have a small television. Kabul wants him to broadcast for eight hours per night, which he says is impossible because there is fuel for only four hours, and besides that, the electricity in Chaghcharan works only for five hours per night, so how could the people watch eight hours of television?
This is the only channel in Ghor Province, but many languages are spoken here, so I asked about the languages that are used to broadcast. Kendewalli answered that he broadcasts in Turkoman, Pashai, Balochi and some Hindi. But the primary languages in Ghor are Pashto and Dari. Most broadcasting is in Dari, and after that Pashto.
I asked how much broadcasting is generated by his station, and how much is piped in from Kabul. Kendewalli said he transmits 1.5 hours of local coverage, and the other 2.5 comes from Kabul, but Kabul wants all four hours of the transmission time. Kendewalli said his entire budget is only $1,000 per month and he needs $2,600 just for fuel. Fuel was a touchy subject with the chief, and he went on for several minutes.
Changing the subject, I asked if there were any radio stations, newspapers or other forms of media. Kendewalli said there was no radio (Lt. Varna said there is a private station), but there were about six newspapers. None are dailies, but there are weeklies, bi-weeklies, and monthlies. Kendewalli said most can’t read anyway, and so the way to reach them is through his station. Kendewalli said that the people can never understand democracy unless someone explains democracy. “If they are not educated, they are asleep,” he said.
After maybe an hour of learning about the dramas of being the only television station in Ghor Province, I asked if there was anything specific that he wanted to get out to a broader audience. Kendewalli’s answer was as succinct as it was unambiguous: “I need fuel.”
From here out, the conversation was all over the map. Kendewalli wanted to keep talking about the people. He walked up to a giant poster on the wall, depicting landscape that was literally right outside his front door. He pointed to the snow-covered peaks and pointed out villages that were invisible on the poster, saying those villages and many others are snowed in for about six months each year. He said the people actually stayed up there through the winter, which was incredible to even consider. They must be like Eskimos. They have no schools, no clinics, no nothing. They can’t even come down to Chaghcharan, which also is trapped. He said that the better-off families might have 1-2 cows or 5-10 sheep. And they stay up there, isolated for months at a time.
I asked about the temperatures. The television chief answered that in 2006, the temperature once reached -42ºC (about -44ºF) right here in Chaghcharan, which is in the valley. He saw the looks of disbelief on our faces, and repeated, saying it was true. He said that for a very, very short period, the temperature surely reached -42ºC, and that was the coldest he’d ever seen in the town. From there he spontaneously said that he had noticed the climate change over the past 25-30 years and that it’s getting warmer.
Kendewalli said the primary problems in Ghor Province are the following:
1) Lack of education
2) Poverty
3) Joblessness
He said the men go to Iran and Pakistan for money, or down south to harvest the opium and fight the Coalition. But, I protested, don’t the Tajiks hate the Talibs? Yes, he answered, but they need the money.
“How much do they earn for fighting?” I asked.
Kendewalli said they get clothes and food, a Kalashnikov and a little money. I asked how much money and he laughed, saying it depends on their job and how they do. If they kill soldiers they earn more. He reiterated that they hate the Taliban but need the money, so they go off to fight and harvest opium and then come home. He said the fight in Helmand has nothing to do with the opium, and that the British came back for uranium. He said that Afghanistan is very rich in resources, and global powers constantly come to fight but they always lie.
Despite his direct words, throughout the talk he seemed genuinely friendly. He was not complaining, as I saw it, but merely answering my questions.
I asked about his education. Kendewalli said he graduated from high school in Chaghacharan, then studied teaching one year in Herat, but quit school because his family was poor. So he returned to Chaghacharan and taught “all subjects.”
He seemed genuinely happy with the help from the PRT, but said the United States is wasting all that money fighting down south, and that construction here was too slow. And Kendewalli warned me several more times to say exactly what he said.
And that was it. The Lithuanians bought a goat and loaded into an SUV, and we headed back to base while I watched for men wearing tennis shoes.
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Iraq Braces for U.S. Pullout
Please Click Here to view the entire interview with Michael on AMNY.com.
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Sean Pillai interviews Jeff Mellinger
27 June 2009
Kabul, Afghanistan
The clearest sign that I am back in Afghanistan is that the electricity is out again. Other than that, the day is bright, shiny and cool in Kabul.
While reading/listening through the morning news, this excellent interview with Command Sergeant Major Jeff Mellinger popped up. The interview was conducted by Sean Pillai.
CSM Mellinger has spent about 37 years in the United States Army. He was the single most knowledgeable soldier I ever met when it comes to the ground war in Iraq. He's a walking encyclopedia who spent more time on those hot, dangerous streets than most grunts. CSM Mellinger gained immense respect from the combat troops. He only had two bosses in Iraq. The first was General Casey, and the second was General Petraeus, Jeff Mellinger didn't like office life. He liked to walk the line.
The electricity is back on, so this message can now get back to you.
Michael
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The Road to Hell: Part II
27 June 2009
Afghanistan
With so many contractors, journalists, and even tourists floating around Afghanistan, some are bound to be kidnapped. The recent escape by David Rohde provides a happy conclusion, though these things often end up with a bullet in the head, or a head sawed off for all to see. Kidnappings are so common in Afghanistan that most barely make the news.
The New York Times and big media outlets are being blamed for suppressing the story and thereby giving special treatment to one of their own. It’s clear that they did give special treatment to one of their own. In fact, when police lose an officer, they also put special emphasis on the crime, and when soldiers lose one of their own, they also put special emphasis on rescue. Iraqi soldiers who helped us locate American soldiers were sometimes upset that we barely lifted a finger when their own were captured and brutally tortured. That the New York Times gave special treatment to one of its own is a fact. That the U.S. military does the same is a fact. Maybe it’s human nature.
Months after the kidnapping, I reported a few sentences after the story had been out there on the web, but I also kept subsequent information quiet upon request from related parties. This was not out of special treatment for journalists but in the name of decency. There are many soldiers out there who know that I also have not reported information that was free to be reported, but that would jeopardize their lives or the security of the United States or that of our allies. Scoop be damned.
I am a writer, not a journalist, and do not track down “scoops.” Some things should not be printed until their time has come, if at all. When it’s all said and done, and you grow old and grey—if you make it that far—above all else it’s more important to know that you worked with honor above ambition.
War correspondence must be one of the most dangerous jobs in the world. Among the journalists, photographers and writers of the world—of which there must be millions—the true war correspondents are the “special forces.” How many true war correspondents have been produced in this generation? The number must be limited to the dozens.
Faces change but the danger is constant. There is no way around it. Doing the job safely is impossible. Some say that the best way to avoid danger is to stay with the troops. This is completely false. I spent more time with U.S. troops in Iraq than any correspondent from any organization, and the same might also be true of British forces. The time with the troops has been far more dangerous than time spent unembedded. I’ve never been in a shootout in Iraq or Afghanistan other than those times with U.S. or British forces, in which case it would be impossible to remember all the firefights, bombs, sniper attacks, or all the dead bodies. The most dangerous work that one can do is to embed with our combat troops. Nothing else comes close.
Yet there is something particularly edgy about going alone, as David Rohde has done. Only our most highly trained soldiers go out in tiny numbers, and none, to my knowledge, go out the way correspondents do. When I have showed up at the front gates of U.S. or British bases, the soldiers tend to be astounded or even appalled. They can’t believe anyone would be dumb or crazy enough go out there without bristling guns, helicopter support, and armor. But again, the fact is, I have never been attacked while alone, but when I am with U.S. or British forces people all around me get hit and it’s only by the Grace of God that I haven’t been hit.
David Rohde’s journey was peculiar because it’s . . . well, peculiar. He is a high-profile man associated with a high-profile company. Otherwise, his kidnapping was just one of probably hundreds, or more.
The dangers of going unembedded are different than when with soldiers. I could give some hints that could increase the safety of correspondents and contractors, but those hints are not for public discussion other than this: If you are a civilian contractor or journalist who goes into areas with possibility of kidnapping, it’s important to give written permission for a rescue attempt. For servicemembers, no permission would be needed, but journalists, contractors and NGOs will likely not be rescued without permission from a spouse or close relative, unless that permission was granted in advance. Precious time will be lost gaining those permissions. Most rescues are better done immediately.
There have been times when rescues could have occurred but permission was slow in coming. Our “rescue people” are the best in the world. I cannot address the situation of David Rohde because I do not know the facts, other than that he was kidnapped in Afghanistan and taken to Pakistan. After he hit Pakistan, everything changed. The first days after a kidnapping are crucial.
This rescue is a prime example:
US Commandos Rescue American Hostage Near Kabul
AP Exclusive: US Special Forces rescue American held captive near Kabul for 2 months
Last year, a senior defense official gave me a casual briefing on this operation. Apparently, our folks knew the entire time where the hostage was being held. Our people were ready to go on a moment’s notice. The family, I was told, refused to give permission to conduct a rescue attempt. Finally, when their hope began to wane, the family agreed to the rescue attempt and he was rescued immediately. There have been other rescues.
After ten French soldiers were killed near Sarobi, Afghanistan, and U.S. Army admin hassles precluded my embedding with combat forces, I went to hear the villagers’ side of the story. (Amazing how ink that could have gone to our own forces got dashed by paperwork.) Surely the trip was very dangerous but the insight was valuable and was published under “The Road to Hell.”
Shortly after I went there, a female reporter tried to retrace the steps and got kidnapped. In fact, I was told by a close source that my interpreter, “Zee,” was involved in her kidnapping and that he was arrested:
ASIA: Kidnapped Dutch journalist freed: employer
07 Nov 2008 9:35 PM
KABUL, Nov 7 AFP - A Dutch journalist kidnapped by suspected Taliban rebels in Afghanistan a week ago was freed today and was shocked but in good health, her employer said.
The woman, whose name was not released, was captured on Saturday last week while she was en route to do a story about militants who had killed 10 French soldiers in August, an editor at the Belgian P-magazine told AFP.
"Whether she was abducted on the way to them or by them we are not sure," Michael Lescroart told AFP from Belgium.
"She was released this morning," he said.
The woman was captured in the Sarobi district, about 50km from the Afghan capital Kabul.
The kidnappers had claimed to be from the insurgent Taliban, Lescroart said. There had been a ransom demand but he refused to comment further.
Media in Afghanistan had been aware of the kidnapping but had not reported on it after being told it could endanger the journalist.
Asked about this, Lescroart said: "The media blackout did not help her case- it saved her life."
"I think it helped because we were afraid if she was in the media, they could set an example and that is what we wanted to avoid," he said.
The journalist, in her late 30s, was fine but shocked, Lescroart said.
She had been through a medical check-up at a NATO hospital.
The French soldiers were killed in Sarobi in August in the deadliest groundbattle for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force since foreign troops arrived in Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taliban government.
And so that’s about it. I sat on David Rohde information and am happy to have done so. Would the New York Times have done the same for a soldier or for me? That would be their decision.
Michael Yon
Afghanistan
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Michael Jackson
News of Mr. Jackson's death is sweeping around the world. Having worked for Mr. Jackson at his Neverland Ranch, I had the feeling that he was a hostage to his success. Finally, the King of Pop will find peace that he might never have gotten in life.
--
Very Respectfully,
Michael Yon
Dubai
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David Rohde Escapes
21 June 2009
The excellent reporter David Rohde has escaped his kidnappers. My latest word on Mr. Rohde came on about June 1 during a trip with Secretary Gates, when a very well placed source told me in Singapore that the Pentagon had no word on the whereabouts or condition of David Rohde. I first heard about the escape this morning subsequent an interview request to me from the Washington Post.
I first heard about the kidnapping in late 2008. The initial information came to me in Afghanistan from a source close to Rohde. During a subsequent trip in December with Secretary Gates, I asked a well placed source about the whereabouts and condition of Mr. Rohde. I was told that the information suggested he had been moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan. News about the kidnapping continued to leak, though mainstream outlets kept it quiet. I published a small paragraph several months later, in March 2009, but then archived the paragraph based on a request from concerned parties. Through the months, interesting information about Mr. Rohde has come my way but was always followed by a request to keep it quiet.
Welcome home David Rohde.
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Southern Philippines
Afghanistan of the Sea
17 June 2009
Small teams of American troops are spread across many locations in the southern Philippines. Each team works side-by-side with Filipino counterparts. The jobs vary. Navy SEALs and Special Boat Teams often support the AFP (Armed Forces Philippines) on actual operations. I have been briefed on some of these operations - though without the physical access one gets in Iraq or Afghanistan. One truism of embedding: the more they are fighting, the closer the writer is welcome to get, right up into the middle.
Our folks do not engage in direct combat unless they are being attacked, but the Philippine commanders enjoy the direct, non-combat support, including the occasional use of U.S. warships. American ships don't fire their weapons or engage in combat.
Other teams conduct Civilian Military Operations (CMO). In fact, the U.S. and AFP say that 80% of the fight in the Philippines has nothing to do with guns. It’s about securing the people, building roads, clinics and schools; digging wells and developing a viable political process. Helping the farmers to work without being harassed by Islamic jihadist terror groups such as Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah have shrunken the terrorists' habitat. Village by village, the AFP is gaining ground.
The Filipino officers with whom I've spent many hours have a far more sophisticated view of how to fight this fight than we see with Iraqi counterparts. Afghans are not even in the same league.
This reality, along with the fact that we have a good number of our own special operations forces here, goes far toward explaining how, even with the light footprint, the terrorist organizations are on the defense in the RoP (Republic of Philippines).
In cooperating with the AFP, small groups of our people are spread out at many locations on four islands. At the location pictured above, on Jolo island, there were six Military Police from the U.S. Army/Japan, two National Guardsmen from the 1-294th Infantry in Guam, and four Green Berets from the 1st Special Forces Group. On the island of Mindanao, our folks have great freedom of movement and force protection is light, but on this island our people use up-armored Humvees, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, though the bombs here are nothing like those in Iraq. The bombs in the Philippines often are made from small mortars, or they are “fish bombs” (locals use “depth charges” to catch fish), but the islands also are chock full of M-16s. AFP commanders say that even the poorest farmers are likely to have guns.
[Note: Some more detailed dispatches are in the works regarding the Philippines. I have departed the Philippines on route to Afghanistan. Pakistan embassy declined to issue a visa this morning.]
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Philippines
"Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us."
-John F. Kennedy
03 June 2009
Mindanao
The southern Philippines has been a festering bed for international terrorists for decades. Direct links with al Qaeda and associated groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI), are conclusively established. These groups are collectively responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent people from dozens of countries. JI, for instance, was responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing that killed 202 people, including my friend Beata Pawlak.
Some folks are asking why greater successes are being achieved in the Philippines with a smaller footprint than we have in Afghanistan, and they are starting to wonder if this model would work in Pakistan. There can be no simple answer; the best approach is simply to attempt to describe the situation here. A comprehensive description likely would require dozens of stories spread over months of research. Today is the third day of eight days for me, so it is important that the reader understand that my ground situation awareness in the Philippines is not of the depth which I developed in Iraq, or am developing in Afghanistan. This writing is based on talking with soldiers over the past few years who have served here, and also after talking with dozens of veterans on the ground who are engaged in the current fight.
The Philippines has a strong cultural affinity with the United States that we do not enjoy in Iraq or Afghanistan. It’s easy for Americans to quickly establish good, mutual dialogue with Filipinos, and many Filipinos, for instance, work for American companies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our societies already are intertwined. Americans in general are not foreign to/with the Filipinos in the way that we are with great numbers of Iraqis and the overwhelming majority of Afghans. Most of the Afghans we meet are nearly completely foreign to us, whereas Filipinos are no more foreign than, say, Spanish or Mexicans. Most school textbooks in the Philippines are in English, and even military reports are all written in English. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos speak English. One of the greatest strengths of the U.S. military is that it consists of a hodgepodge of people from around the world. Given the diversity of the U.S. military, and other factors listed above, the cultural gap here is just a hop, skip and a jump, whereas the cultural bridge needed for Afghanistan is more like the Golden Gate – or bigger.
The Philippines also is a functioning democracy with a working Constitution, and the country has a competent military and national police, though both are a work in progress. But like Afghanistan, especially, the Philippines lacks infrastructure in the hinterlands where the insurgencies thrive. Also like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the enemies facing the Philippines are actually an amalgam of groups with goals that sometimes overlap and sometimes diverge. In the Philippines, the Communists Peoples’ Party (CPP) and the communist New Peoples’ Army (NPA) seek to overthrow the government. Meanwhile, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) wishes to establish a caliphate, but apparently has no intention of conducting international terrorism. In fact, the CPP and MILF both are both legal organizations other than in regard to some elements within them which conduct terrorism, and which are targeted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces Philippines (AFP). The United States does not participate in this fighting. The MILF has a website, and the Philippine government makes no attempt to shut it down because those who do not fight with guns are free to talk here, though both groups have been involved in terrorism. Fragile dialogue is underway. As in America, you are free to fight with words, but not free to fight with guns. The Philippines is a democracy and freedom of speech is a right, so they enjoy the good and suffer the bad and the ugly that comes along with those freedoms as much as we do.
In contrast to CPP and MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) are international terrorist organizations that regularly commit mass murder, and their goals extend far beyond the Philippines.
And so, at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the United States is here to assist the people of the Philippines in combating only these two groups – ASG and JI – which benefits not only the Philippines and us, but other nations around the world, such as Australia, who sustained great losses in the JI attacks in Bali. The United States does not, according to our government and the GRP, engage in direct combat operations, though we have lost fifteen in the line of duty, including ten who were lost in a 2002 helicopter crash unrelated to fighting. A Navy SEAL told me yesterday that earlier in the morning someone fired about fifty rounds at one of our helicopters but missed. The danger for our folks is real, but not at the level that many of these veterans have faced elsewhere.
The U.S. force here consists of between roughly 580-620 members from the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines. Heavy emphasis is placed on community projects such as road building, schools, text book distribution, medical programs and information outreach. Philippine Admiral Alexander Pama told me today that security and governance ends at the end of the paved roads. Literally where the roads end, that’s where bad guy country begins. This is also true in Afghanistan (not so much in Iraq because Iraq has good roads). Our people also provide intelligence, training and logistical support. Members of the AFP regularly attend schools in the United States. USAID, I am told by U.S. and AFP officers, is doing excellent work here with civic projects, which helps dry up the pond where the terrorists can fester.
The approach to eliminating ASG and JI is easy to sum up: dry up the sanctuaries and raison d’être, and kill or capture the hardcore who won’t give up. They are out there even now intimidating the people, running extortion rackets, and kidnapping innocent civilians and often beheading them. They kill people with bombs, guns and knives. Though the goals are easy to explain, execution requires a sophisticated dance between Civil Affairs, MIST or (Military Information Support Teams), Public Affairs, Navy SEALs, Green Berets, EOD, and a host of other important players such as USAID. But by far the most important in this fight are the GRP and the people. Winning the people means winning the war.
There are other actors in this endeavor who also appeared in Iraq and Afghanistan. Private groups in America - often just a couple of people with a will to make a difference - are shipping much needed English textbooks, wheelchairs and other aid to war zones. It is difficult to convey just how helpful these tiny points of light were in Iraq and are in Afghanistan. The contributions to success are immeasurable, but they certainly are significant, and this was in fact pointed out to me today when soldiers talked respectfully about “Books for Barrios,” “Knights Bridge International” and others. Whether the donations are textbooks, wheelchairs, or in the form of doctors and nurses donating time and expertise to mend cleft lips and palates, their generous actions go far to improving lives, building international bridges, and, indeed, even fighting terrorism.
This summarizes what our folks are doing with the GRP and the people here in the Philippines. In subsequent dispatches, we’ll get “down in the weeds.”
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British Forces at War: As Witnessed by an American
First Published 11 April 2007 
Basra, Iraq
The explosions from enemy rockets and mortar fire have been constant companions for the small contingent of Coalition forces based at the former Basra Palace, on the banks of Shatt al Arab River. In the past five months, more than a thousand bombs have been fired at this small base, all while these British combat troops, Romanian soldiers and a small contingent of Americans continue their attempts to stabilize Iraq. The nearby US Regional Embassy office also is frequently targeted.
A dramatic surge in IDF attacks (indirect fire: rockets and mortars) began here in September 2006, subsequent an increase in British troops. Locals cite Iranian influence behind the attacks, while British officers say this is the most IDF’d base in Iraq. The dozens of bombs that exploded on the base in the first five days of my embed with a British infantry platoon punctuated those claims.
The building where many British forces live is frequently hit. Recently a rocket slammed into the living quarters, creating a massive gape and much wreckage, while severely wounding one soldier from 5 Platoon. Just this week, a mortar bomb severely damaged a British armored vehicle parked outside, and another bomb explosively pruned a treetop, fragging the building where soldiers live, and leaving ears ringing. A 5 Platoon soldier videotaped the impact as it happened. Amazingly, despite the frequency of the IDF attacks, a combination of force protection measures and sheer luck have prevented the death of any British soldier, though combat forces have been seriously wounded from them. The risk of spending an hour outside the building might be equivalent to smoking a thousand cartons of unfiltered cigarettes. And Crossfit exercise might not help: the old gym was blasted a few days ago.
Earlier this week, when Moqtada al Sadr issued a call to violence against Coalition forces, multiple IDF strikes were launched against this base. Militias based in the al Quibla district of Basra, a notorious haven for Shia “JAM” militias who are loyal to or influenced by al Sadr, were believed responsible. Many of their shots miss the base, landing in civilian populations. According to the British commanders, JAM members will attack local journalists who report these mistakes.
Before al Sadr issued his provocation, the British Army was planning aggressive offensive actions against terrorists and militia members, and allowed this writer to join 5 Platoon, 2nd Battalion, “The Rifles” Battle Group for six days of missions. Those missions included Operation Arezzo, named for the Tuscan city that was the site of famous battles in the 14th century, and of an important victory for British troops in July 1944 as they drove the Axis forces north and out of Italy for good.
Operation Arezzo
Lieutenant Colonel Justin Maciejewski MBE, the Battle Group Operations Commander (equivalent to an American Battalion Commander), allowed this writer unprecedented access to the planning details of Operation Arezzo, part of three simultaneous strike and arrest operations in the al Quibla district of Basra, designed in part to bait the enemy into attacking British forces.
In all, 13 platoons would partake, and I’d accompany 5 Platoon. LTC Maciejewski further permitted me to record both video and still camera images during the operation, and to get as close to the combat as I dare. 5 Platoon has seen a lot of fighting in recent months, and had already taken me on several minor missions. For Operation Arezzo, they adopted me as one of their own.
The plan for Operation Arezzo was cleverly contrived. While Americans count on helicopter support for deliberate high-intensity combat here, the Brits were going into extremely hostile terrain, outnumbered, without helicopter support, relying instead upon timing, terrain, maneuverability, firepower, and sheer audacity.
In combat, luck can be a decisive factor, but Murphy’s Law remains in effect. For Operation Arezzo, the risks of something going catastrophically wrong were apparent at the outset. The soldiers in 5 Platoon had never conducted such an audacious operation—in broad daylight—but LTC Maciejewski intended to show the enemy that even in their strongest bastion, outnumbered British forces could strike into their heart and inflict heavy losses.
Shortly before the mission, as soldiers from 5 Platoon disassembled their weapons for cleaning (again), performed functions checks, the tone of the music coming out of their speakers changed. As with American combat forces, before embarking on a deliberate fight, the music became more rousing and to the bone. For Operation Arezzo, the pre-battle tune was Gimme Shelter, by the Rolling Stones:
War, Children, it’s just a shot away
It’s just a shot away
War, Children, it’s just a shot away
It’s just a shot away
With all the emphasis on timing, 5 Platoon and others (including me) conducted rehearsals just hours before the strike yesterday. Getting to the al Quibla district in one piece was far from certain as we loaded into vehicles and rumbled out into JAM country. Some IEDs (bombs) buried in roads here are so large they would completely destroy the Bulldog tracked vehicle in which we were riding. Just last week a formidable Challenger tank was destroyed by an explosion that also seriously injured the driver. Days before, four British soldiers and their Iraqi interpreter had been killed at the same place when a similar bomb detonated.
As we rumbled through the dry, desert heat, the smells of Iraq—nearly all of them bad—wafted down from the top hatch. Suddenly, the Bulldog was filled with a stench so awful that soldiers nearly gagged, as if everything that could rot in Iraq had gone rotten all at once. Where just moments before there was only dusty air in the compartment, in a flash it was filled with that horrendous, fetid stench and a swarm of flies. When, a few minutes later, the stench was suddenly replaced by smoke from outside, dozens of flies remained in the compartment.
The unilateral British operation began in mid-afternoon on 10 April, kicked off with rapid ground assaults on half a dozen target houses in the district, in an attempt to kill or capture key local militia leaders, including known terrorists such as “The Turban,” who local British forces call “The Turbinator.” The soldiers of 5 Platoon were combat proven after five months of fighting. Last week, they were engaged in a sharp firefight. One soldier captured the action with videocam on his helmet as six enemy were killed in the street fighting, including one enemy who suffered a direct hit from a 5 Platoon grenade launcher. There were no friendly casualties.
Now 5 Platoon was leading a key part of Operation Arezzo, their only effective close air support were the British snipers on rooftops. We approached the first target, and the Squaddies rushed out the back of the Bulldog with me in tow, crashing through gates and tossing flashbang grenades into doorways before bursting into houses while I made video of the strike.
But that light touch was reserved for women and children only, as “The Rifles” would soon demonstrate. With the raids on house targets completed, a new phase of the plan unfolded and the drama really began.
During planning, British commanders, including Major Quentin Naylor, had briefed that JAM likely would try to lure us into ambush in a certain area. Now, eerily according to plan, sporadic small arms began from the very direction British commanders had anticipated. If 5 Platoon had moved aggressively in that direction, casualties from our side might be severe, but instead, British forces in armored vehicles moved to other pre-planned areas, hoping to draw the enemy out of hiding and into tactical blunders. The enemy answered the challenge with great enthusiasm, and blundered.
They opened on us with massive small-arms fire from many directions, and RPGs. One RPG slammed into a British vehicle and exploded in the slot armor, but the vehicle took the hit, and the men inside continued to fight. The enemy pounded at one of the platoons with at least one large machine gun, possibly a 12.7 mm, which can blow a man in half and easily defeat British or American armor. But soldiers in that platoon responded with blistering fire, and silenced the gun.
The ensuing firefights were vigorous. As more enemy joined and the battle progressed, British elements maneuvered and fired, making adjustments to the plan to mold the fight. With no helicopters above to help develop ground awareness or to help shape the combat by engaging targets, British commanders directed their elements by map and ground-feel. Having no helicopters also left rooftops open to the enemy, adding another dimension to the combat. In addition to small arms, British soldiers used 7.62mm machineguns, grenades, and 30mm guns with deadly focus. As soldiers ran out of ammunition, they dropped back to reload, while other soldiers kept up the aimed shots.
The enemy was at times on both sides of us firing from many positions, on the ground and on rooftops. 5 Platoon and others continued answering heavy fire with accurate return fire. I saw a soldier fire his 40mm grenade launcher several times, arching explosive rounds into enemy positions. A British sniper fired four bullets. One 7.62 mm bullet struck an armed man on a rooftop in the chest. Another bullet stopped a gunman who was firing from a car.
Bullets popped into the walls of the vehicles. British planners had anticipated that JAM would by now have placed large IEDs on our egress routes, and the commanders’ plan to defeat this threat so far was working. At least one IED was in fact placed to get us, but exploded at the wrong time and missed a Bulldog.
As the firing began to wane, the day’s heat began to fade along with it. Dust wafted thick on the cooling air. The soldiers were still sweating when a light rain began to fall. Iraqi dust polluted the pure rain as it fell, forming mud drops that splattered onto man and machine.
In an operation that lasted over four hours, British forces killed 26-27 enemy and sustained no casualties. 5 Platoon fired more than 4,000 bullets before their guns began to cool, and about 15 of the enemy kills were accredited to 5 Platoon. Another platoon captured two enemy fighters, including one Iraqi policeman who might have been heeding al Sadr’s call for Iraqi Police and Army forces to turn on their Coalition partners.
“Smoking Kills”
Later that evening, back on base, “squaddies” were outside the converted palace where we sleep, grabbing quick smokes. “Smoking kills” is the common joke. (British soldiers, like their American kin, are quick with dry combat humor.) But with all the IDF attacks, soldiers here truly are taking extreme risks to smoke outside. The palace had just been hit yesterday, and today more rain fell on its fractured façade. Sadr had just called for his militias to attack the Coalition, and “The Rifles” had just killed a couple dozen enemy fighters in JAM country, which was within easy rocket range of the base.
Rifleman Lee Hulbert, wearing his helmet and body armor, was smoking with his friends when Murphy’s Law kicked in. There was no rocket attack, no lightning strike. About 15 meters (about 50 feet) above Lee’s head, three heavy pieces of marble, each weighing perhaps 10 kg (more than 20 lbs), dislodged from the palace, and hurtled toward Lee Hulbert. One piece struck the back of his helmet, crashed off his body armor, and he fell quiet to the ground. Hulbert had fought well throughout his tour in Iraq, only to be felled by a piece of marble. He’s been med-evac’d and is said to be in good condition.
The British are planning future operations. These soldiers are so good that I have requested from British commanders to be allowed to stay longer.
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Little Girl
First Published May 14, 2005
(Media please contact inquiries@michaelyon-online.com)
Mosul
Major Mark Bieger found this little girl after the car bomb that attacked our guys while kids were crowding around. The soldiers here have been angry and sad for two days. They are angry because the terrorists could just as easily have waited a block or two and attacked the patrol away from the kids. Instead, the suicide bomber drove his car and hit the Stryker when about twenty children were jumping up and down and waving at the soldiers. Major Bieger, I had seen him help rescue some of our guys a week earlier during another big attack, took some of our soldiers and rushed this little girl to our hospital. He wanted her to have American surgeons and not to go to the Iraqi hospital. She didn’t make it. I snapped this picture when Major Bieger ran to take her away. He kept stopping to talk with her and hug her.
The soldiers went back to that neighborhood the next day to ask what they could do. The people were very warm and welcomed us into their homes, and many kids were actually running up to say hello and to ask soldiers to shake hands.
Eventually, some insurgents must have realized we were back and started shooting at us. The American soldiers and Iraqi police started engaging the enemy and there was a running gun battle. I saw at least one IP who was shot, but he looked okay and actually smiled at me despite the big bullet hole in his leg. I smiled back.
One thing seems certain; the people in that neighborhood share our feelings about the terrorists. We are going to go back there, and if any terrorists come out, the soldiers hope to find them. Everybody is still very angry that the insurgents attacked us when the kids were around. Their day will come.
[Post Script]
The reaction to my photo of Major Bieger cradling Farah, the little girl who died in his arms, provoked a flood of messages and heartfelt responses from caring people around the world. I have spent the last several days trying to read every message, and respond to as many as possible, but the flow has finally outpaced me, much as the swiftness of a river will finally defeat even the most determined swimmer.
This morning there was a banging on my door. It was “Q,” loaded for battle, weapon in hand, wearing the military radio headphones with the microphone that wrapped around his face. Bang, Bang, Bang! Q hit my door.
“Mike! Where are you?!”
“Hold on,” I said, opening the door.
“Why aren’t you ready! Grab your gear . . . we’re going!” My worn-out boots sat empty in the corner.
“I can’t go today,” I said, glancing in the direction of my laptop.
“What?”
“Just tell them I can’t go today.”
“Okay!” And Q trotted off back to his Stryker, leaving me behind. The soldiers rolled out on their mission without me.
And now I sit here, answering a few final emails, while the men of Deuce Four patrol in Mosul. My hands may be here, but my head and heart are on the streets in the struggle. I’ve been riding the wave of interest and feedback from that photo, but I need to get back to what I seem best equipped to do–posting dispatches about what is happening here in Iraq. I will continue to read every message, and I offer my sincere thanks in advance for everyone who takes the time to send one, but, alas, with this dispatch, I must swim to shore.
Michael
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